

Law Enforcement Against Corruption in Indonesia: Between Expectation and Reality

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Abstrak

This study critically examines the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts against corruption in Indonesia, highlighting the persistent gap between legal expectations and practical outcomes. Despite a comprehensive legal framework including Law No. 31/1999, Law No. 20/2001, and the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Key Alta institutions continue to face political interference, limited resources, legal loopholes, and inconsistent prosecutorial practices. For example, underscore that although asset recovery and conviction rates have risen, sentencing disparities and institutional constraints remain prevalent, impeding deterrence. Complementing this, identifies political coercion and inadequate capacity at enforcement bodies such as the KPK, police, and judiciary as key impediments. This research employs a normative-juridical method, reviewing legislation, judicial rulings, and institutional practices. It also integrates recent Scopus-indexed empirical studies to strengthen its analytical framework. The findings reveal that while recent innovations such as digital oversight in public procurement have improved transparency and stakeholder engagement, they have not yet substantially closed enforcement gaps. The study concludes that sustainable progress requires enhancing institutional independence, ensuring sufficient funding and resources, tightening legal provisions, fostering judicial reform, and embracing innovative approaches such as e-procurement systems and civil society oversight. These measures are essential to bridging the divide between aspirations and reality in Indonesia's anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms, thereby meeting both domestic expectations and global standards.

Keywords: Digital oversight, Corruption, Law enforcement

A. INTRODUCTION

Corruption remains a deeply rooted issue in Indonesia's legal and political landscape. Despite a variety of anti-corruption laws and the presence of specialized institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), corrupt practices continue to persist at all levels of government and public service. According to the

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2023 released by Transparency International, Indonesia scored 34 out of 100, indicating a serious integrity deficit in public institutions (International, 2023). In the same vein, KPK data shows that over 1,400 individuals, including high-ranking officials, have been prosecuted since its establishment, yet the recurrence of corruption cases remains high (Pradini & Susanti, n.d.)

Several recent high-profile corruption cases underscore the limitations of law enforcement in curbing such practices. In early 2025, the Indonesian Attorney General's Office uncovered a massive corruption scandal involving Pertamina Patra Niaga, with alleged losses to the state exceeding IDR 193.7 trillion due to fraudulent oil imports and subsidized fuel distribution (Reuters, 2025a). Around the same time, another investigation led to the seizure of approximately USD 725 million from Wilmar Group for its involvement in illegal palm oil export licensing practices, which also implicated several judges and attorneys in bribery schemes (Reuters, 2025b), (Reuters, 2025c). These cases not only demonstrate the scale of corruption but also expose systemic weaknesses in legal oversight and judicial integrity.

The 2025 "Chromebook Scandal" further revealed institutional gaps in monitoring and procurement procedures, where the Ministry of Education was investigated for alleged irregularities in the IDR 9.9 trillion procurement of over one million devices. Investigations pointed to abrupt changes in technical specifications and suspected collusion between ministry officials and private vendors (Wikipedia, 2025). Meanwhile, studies have shown that even the introduction of digital systems like e-procurement has not significantly reduced corruption in public tenders. (Saputra & Chariri, 2023) found persistent collusion and manipulation despite the presence of digital transparency tools, while (Suardi et al., 2025) concluded that e-procurement only moderates corruption risks if combined with strong institutional governance.

The ineffectiveness of law enforcement efforts is further reflected in institutional fragmentation, lack of coordination between enforcement bodies (police, prosecutors, and KPK), and a legal culture that tolerates impunity (Agustin et al., 2025). Although Indonesia has adopted Law No. 31 of 1999 in conjunction with Law No. 20 of 2001 on the Eradication of Corruption, implementation on the ground is often marred by political interference and selective prosecution (Tomagola et al., 2024). This phenomenon reveals a striking gap between the state's normative commitment to anti-corruption and the practical outcomes of enforcement.

Hence, this study seeks to answer a fundamental question: How effective is the enforcement of anti-corruption law in Indonesia, and what are the contributing factors behind the persistent gap between legal ideals and enforcement realities?

1. State of the Art of Previous Research

Corruption in Indonesia has become a central concern in legal scholarship, with numerous studies analyzing both the regulatory framework and its implementation. A significant portion of this research has highlighted the disjunction between legal instruments and enforcement practices, particularly at the local level. For instance, (Umacina & Amsori, 2024) emphasized that legal uncertainty and inconsistency in judicial interpretations often hinder the prosecution of corruption, especially in regional government contexts where oversight is weak and political interference is strong.

(Fadillah, 2024) explored the foundations of anti-corruption legislation, noting that while the Corruption Law (Law No. 31/1999 jo. Law No. 20/2001) provides a substantial basis for criminal prosecution, procedural fragmentation and legal loopholes create opportunities for defendants to exploit technicalities. This is particularly evident in protracted litigation processes and appeals, which often lead to sentence reductions or acquittals.

(Calvin, 2024) conducted a comparative study between Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). The study found that the broader investigative authority and institutional independence of CPIB enable more effective corruption eradication in Singapore. By contrast, the KPK's powers have been gradually eroded through legislative revisions, such as the controversial 2019 amendment, which significantly limited its wiretapping and investigation autonomy.

In light of ongoing developments, several newer studies have focused on technological interventions in corruption prevention, particularly through e-procurement and digital governance. (Saputra & Chariri, 2023) critically examined the effectiveness of e-procurement systems in curbing corruption in public procurement and concluded that collusion and manipulation remain prevalent despite digitalization. Their findings suggest that technological tools, when not accompanied by institutional integrity and accountability, may serve only as cosmetic reforms.

(Suardi et al., 2025) expanded this perspective by using structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze how e-procurement moderates the relationship between procurement governance and corruption. They concluded that e-procurement does not directly eliminate corruption but functions as a conditional enabler, dependent on the strength of institutional governance mechanisms. This aligns with the findings of (Hariani & Supeno, 2024) who observed that in local governments, e-procurement is often manipulated through changes in technical specifications and restricted vendor access, perpetuating systemic corruption under a veneer of transparency.

However, despite this growing body of literature, there remains a notable research gap in the integration of normative legal analysis with empirical institutional realities. Existing studies often treat legal texts and implementation separately, without assessing

how legal design, enforcement behavior, and political dynamics interact in real-world cases—such as the 2025 Pertamina scandal, Wilmar bribery case, and the Chromebook procurement debacle. These cases illustrate how weaknesses in law enforcement are not merely technical, but deeply rooted in structural and political arrangements.

In sum, while prior research has contributed important insights into the nature and regulation of corruption in Indonesia, there is a clear need for a comprehensive approach that bridges legal doctrine, enforcement practice, and institutional reform. This article addresses that gap by analyzing both the normative framework and recent case evidence to evaluate the true effectiveness of anti-corruption law enforcement in Indonesia.

2. Problem and Gap Analysis

While numerous studies have explored the legal and institutional dimensions of anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia, most tend to approach these aspects in isolation. Legal scholars often focus solely on statutory frameworks and doctrinal interpretation, whereas empirical studies emphasize institutional dynamics without examining how the normative design of laws may contribute to enforcement failures. This fragmentation in approach has resulted in limited understanding of how law, institutions, and political structures interact to either advance or obstruct anti-corruption objectives.

Moreover, although digital mechanisms such as e-procurement and e-budgeting have been introduced as part of governance reform, empirical evidence (Saputra & Chariri, 2023), (Suardi et al., 2025) suggests that these systems are frequently undermined by informal networks and elite capture. Despite technological improvements, systemic corruption continues to occur in large-scale procurement scandals, such as the 2025 *Chromebook procurement case*, in which specification changes and vendor favoritism were enabled through bureaucratic collusion. Similarly, inter-agency tensions between the Attorney General's Office, the KPK, and the police

have been reported in handling complex cases such as *Wilmar Group's palm oil license bribery* and the *Pertamina fuel fraud case*, further weakening the coherence of enforcement (Agustin et al., 2025; Reuters, 2025).

This article aims to fill these research and policy gaps by examining both the legal foundations and the institutional barriers to anti-corruption enforcement in Indonesia. The research employs a normative juridical approach to assess the sufficiency and limitations of current anti-corruption statutes, while also analyzing case-based empirical data to understand how enforcement operates in practice.

In particular, the distinctiveness of this study lies in:

1. Integrating legal theory and governance practice, particularly the rule of law, institutional accountability, and digital transparency mechanisms, to construct a multi-layered analysis of enforcement dynamics;
2. Focusing on the persistent inter-agency conflicts and legal-political ambiguities that obstruct coordinated action among the KPK, police, judiciary, and other oversight bodies;
3. Offering policy recommendations grounded in recent structural reforms and comparative international practices, especially in contexts that have successfully combined legal autonomy, public participation, and technological monitoring in corruption eradication.

Ultimately, this article positions itself not merely as a critique of the status quo, but as a constructive contribution toward a more integrated and pragmatic model of anti-corruption law enforcement in Indonesia.

B. RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a normative juridical approach (Effendi et al., 2023), focusing on the analysis of legal norms and statutory instruments governing the eradication of corruption

in Indonesia. The core objective of this method is to critically examine the coherence, adequacy, and enforceability of anti-corruption legislation, including Law No. 31 of 1999 in conjunction with Law No. 20 of 2001, the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and relevant constitutional provisions. Legal materials such as laws, government regulations, judicial decisions, and official documents are systematically analyzed to assess the alignment between normative provisions and their practical implementation. In addition to normative legal sources, this research integrates doctrinal literature, peer-reviewed journal articles, and empirical reports published in reputable and Scopus-indexed journals over the past five years. The literature study is conducted to explore how legal theory interacts with institutional realities, particularly in the context of high-profile corruption cases such as the Pertamina fuel fraud, Wilmar palm oil bribery, and the Chromebook procurement scandal. These cases are utilized as reflective case examples to illustrate the tensions between legal expectations and enforcement failures. The collected legal and secondary data are evaluated using a qualitative descriptive analysis technique, allowing for the interpretation of laws in light of socio-political dynamics. This analytical framework helps reveal the practical challenges in institutional coordination, prosecutorial independence, and procedural transparency. Such challenges are viewed not merely as technical deficiencies, but as systemic consequences of Indonesia's legal and governance structure. The combination of legal interpretation, case-based empirical data, and governance theory forms the methodological foundation for this article. The aim is to bridge the gap between doctrinal legal research and the need for critical, evidence-informed analysis in addressing anti-corruption law enforcement.

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the results of the legal and institutional analysis of anti-corruption enforcement in Indonesia, based on the normative juridical method described in

the previous section. Through a systematic review of statutory provisions, judicial practices, and recent high-profile case studies, this chapter provides a critical assessment of how Indonesia's anti-corruption framework operates in practice.

As outlined in the earlier chapters, Indonesia possesses a relatively comprehensive legal framework to combat corruption, and various institutional bodies have been established to support these efforts. However, enforcement has frequently fallen short of expectations, as evidenced by persistent corruption scandals, institutional conflicts, and legal ambiguities.

To answer the research question how effective is anti-corruption law enforcement in Indonesia, and what factors contribute to the persistent implementation gap this chapter is structured into three main sub-sections:

1. The first section examines the legal framework that underpins anti-corruption efforts, including the roles of relevant institutions and the strengths and weaknesses of the existing laws.
2. The second section analyzes the implementation challenges, focusing on institutional conflicts, selective enforcement, and political interference.
3. The third section discusses strategic opportunities and policy recommendations, including digital oversight mechanisms, institutional reform, and lessons from international practices.

Each section is developed based on a combination of legal interpretation, institutional analysis, and empirical illustrations from real-world cases, including the Pertamina fuel fraud, Wilmar palm oil bribery, and the Chromebook procurement scandal. Through this integrative approach, the chapter aims to produce not only a critical understanding of the problem but also practical insights to inform future legal and governance reforms.

1. Legal Framework of Anti-Corruption in Indonesia

To provide a clearer understanding of the current legal and institutional landscape in Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts, the following table summarizes the key regulatory instruments, institutional roles, and the identified strengths and limitations. This tabular presentation is designed to facilitate a structured analysis of how these elements interact, where the enforcement system succeeds, and where it continues to face persistent challenges. By mapping these components side by side, it becomes possible to visualize the systemic gaps between normative legal provisions and the realities of implementation on the ground.

Table 1. Summary of Legal and Institutional Framework in Anti-Corruption Enforcement

Aspect	Key Content	Findings/Analysis
Main Laws	- Law No. 31/1999 jo. Law No. 20/2001	Comprehensive in legal substance, but weakened in implementation due to vague procedures and recent legal amendments
	- KPK Law (Law No. 19/2002, amended 2019)	
	- Law on Corruption Court, Public Finance, Judiciary	
Institutions	- KPK	Fragmentation and overlapping jurisdiction create enforcement delays and agency conflict (Agustin et al., 2025)
	- National Police (Polri)	
	- Attorney General's Office (AGO)	
	- Judiciary	
Strengths	- Detailed legal definitions	Initially strong institutional capacity (pre-2019), international recognition, public trust
	- KPK's mandate includes investigation, prosecution, and asset tracing	
	- Existence of specialized Corruption Court	
Limitations	- Weakened KPK authority after 2019	Legal uncertainty at regional levels, weakening public

	- Ambiguities in appeal procedures	confidence (Fadillah, 2024; Calvin, 2024; Umacina & Amsori, 2024)
	- Selective prosecution and political interference	
Digital Enforcement	- Introduction of e-procurement and digital transparency mechanisms	Only partially effective; vulnerable to manipulation and elite capture (Saputra & Chariri, 2023; Suardi et al., 2025)

The legal and institutional framework for combating corruption in Indonesia is constructed through a series of legislative instruments that, on the surface, offer a strong legal foundation. The principal instruments—Law No. 31 of 1999 jo. Law No. 20 of 2001 define various forms of corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, abuse of authority, and gratuities. Complemented by the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Law on the Corruption Court, the regulatory landscape covers both substantive and procedural elements of anti-corruption enforcement.

However, as shown in Table 1, these laws encounter considerable limitations when subjected to institutional dynamics and practical enforcement. One major strength lies in the comprehensive legal definitions and the establishment of a specialized commission (KPK) with autonomous investigative authority. This institutional design enabled KPK to prosecute high-profile figures and recover state assets, particularly during its formative years, garnering international praise and public confidence.

The situation changed following the 2019 amendment to the KPK Law, which curtailed the commission's independence, especially in relation to its authority to initiate investigations and wiretapping. According to (Calvin, 2024), the new oversight body introduced by the amendment reduced KPK's ability to act without political influence, effectively compromising its effectiveness.

Another key issue lies in the overlapping authority between KPK, the National Police, and the Attorney General's Office. As noted by Agustin et al. (2025), concurrency in jurisdiction has led to conflicts, case duplication, and institutional inefficiency. These issues are especially problematic at the regional level, where law enforcement bodies often face ambiguity in task allocation, contributing to legal uncertainty (Umacina & Amsori, 2024)

Furthermore, although digital tools such as e-procurement and e-audit systems have been introduced to improve transparency and reduce discretionary power, (Saputra & Chariri, 2023) found that these platforms are often bypassed through collusion among vendors and officials. In addition, (Suardi et al., 2025) revealed that digital systems are only effective when supported by robust procurement governance something that remains inconsistent across Indonesia's decentralized system.

Taken together, these findings highlight that while Indonesia's anti-corruption laws appear normatively adequate, their enforcement is hindered by political interference, legal ambiguities, weakened institutions, and inadequate coordination among enforcement bodies. The integration of technology into legal enforcement also remains superficial in many regions, failing to produce the intended deterrent effect without concurrent institutional reforms.

2. Implementation Challenges in Law Enforcement

To further understand the complex realities of anti-corruption enforcement in Indonesia, it is essential to examine the structural and contextual challenges that persist despite the presence of legal and institutional frameworks. While the existing laws provide a formal foundation, their practical application is frequently obstructed by a range of implementation issues that weaken the effectiveness of law enforcement

agencies. These challenges include political interference, institutional fragmentation, limited autonomy and resources, as well as public distrust resulting from perceived selective prosecution. The following table outlines the key obstacles identified in recent literature and case analyses, highlighting both the empirical evidence and its interpretative implications for the integrity of Indonesia's anti-corruption system.

Table 2. Implementation Challenges in Anti-Corruption Enforcement

Challenge	Key Evidence/Facts	Interpretation
Political interference & impunity	Legislative revisions weakening KPK's autonomy (2019) Journal of Education Institute+1review.e-siber.org+1SpringerLink+2USM Journals+2review.e-siber.org+2USM Journals+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4 - KPK reportedly targets political opponents before elections - Low public trust in KPK/Polri (LSI survey 2023) Reddit+1Reddit+1	Politicisation of anti-corruption undermines impartial enforcement and credibility.
Institutional fragmentation & overlap	- <u>Turf wars between KPK, Polri, AG's Office ≈ "gecko vs crocodile" conflict</u> - <u>Underfunding and staffing constraints (KPK operational limits)</u> Wikipedia+15ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute+15Wikipedia+15	Overlapping mandates delay cases and reduce enforcement efficiency.
Lack of independence & resources	- <u>KPK's independence reduced post-2019 (Dewas oversight; ASN status)</u> - <u>Budget just 0.04% of state expenditures; limited regional presence</u> ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute+1Wikipedia+1	Weak structural backbone leads to selective operations and enforcement fatigue.
Selective prosecution & distrust	- Enforcement focused on political rivals pre-election - Perception of selective case selection and immunity for elites Reddit+15review.e-siber.org+15Reddit+15 - Public distrust in judicial/anti-corruption bodies Wikipedia+4review.e-siber.org+4ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute+4	Public disillusionment due to perceived bias deepens legitimacy crisis.

2.1 Political interference & impunity

Since the 2019 amendment to the KPK Law, the commission has been subjected to increased executive oversight, including the establishment of a supervisory board (“Dewas”) that must approve wiretaps an authority previously held solely by KPK. Research by ISEAS notes an “exponential rise” in state losses after this amendment, suggesting that politicisation may have undermined enforcement. Furthermore, analyses show that high-profile prosecutions are often targeted at political opponents in pre-election periods, whereas political elites aligned with the ruling coalition remain largely insulated. Public opinion surveys (LSI, 2023) record declining trust in Polri and KPK below 65%, indicating skepticism about the institutions’ impartiality.

2.2 Institutional fragmentation & overlap

The so-called “gecko vs crocodile” tension between KPK and Polri highlights chronic jurisdictional rivalry. The lack of clear demarcation leads to duplicated investigations and inter-institutional battles over case ownership. KPK operational capacity is further constrained by staffing and resource limitations: its budget peaked at Rp 1.27 trillion (~0.04% of state expenditure), with limited regional presence beyond Jakarta ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. These constraints reduce KPK's ability to operate proactively, especially in coordinated, multi-region cases.

2.3 Lack of independence & resource limitations

Turning KPK employees into civil servants under the 2019 revision eroded organizational autonomy and subjected them to bureaucratic hierarchies. The requirement for prior approval of wiretaps, previously within KPK’s unilateral power, now adds bureaucratic delays and external interference. The commission’s

limited funding and centralized staffing further curtail its capacity to engage in thorough investigations, leaving regional corruption relatively unscathed [Wikipedia](#).

2.4 Selective prosecution & public distrust

Studies and case trends suggest that KPK exercises discretion in selecting cases prioritizing visible political opponents, while allowing aligned elites to escape scrutiny. (Salsabilla, 2024) also documented how loopholes and legal delays enable elites to evade conviction. LSI survey data revealed public skepticism toward judicial and anti-corruption institutions; nearly half of patients rated them below 'trustworthy' thresholds. This climate of distrust undermines legitimacy and hampers public cooperation.

3. Bridging the Gap: Toward Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement

Having examined the structural weaknesses and enforcement challenges in the previous sections, this final part of the discussion aims to identify actionable strategies to address those gaps. Strengthening anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia requires not only reforming legal frameworks but also enhancing institutional design, reinforcing public oversight, and aligning with international standards. The following table outlines key strategic areas along with concrete recommendations derived from empirical studies, recent policy developments, and comparative legal insights. These proposals are intended to support a more coherent, transparent, and effective approach to combating corruption at both the national and subnational levels.

Table 3. Strategic Recommendations for Enhancing Anti-Corruption Enforcement

Strategy Area	Proposed Actions	Rationale & Evidence
Institutional reform & leadership integrity	• Restore KPK’s investigative autonomy (e.g., reverse amendments limiting wiretapping)	KPK’s ability to act independently is central; restoring pre-2019 powers would reduce

	• Strengthen merit-based, transparent recruitment and career progression	executive influence (Calvin, 2024).
Strengthening rule of law & judicial independence	• Enforce stricter guidelines for asset recovery and appeal procedures	Procedural clarity reduces loopholes; research (Fadillah, 2024; Umacina & Amsori, 2024) highlights appeal-related sentence reductions.
	• Empower Corruption Courts with clear prosecutorial timelines and minimum sentencing standards	
Public participation & media oversight	• Expand whistle-blower protections and simplify reporting	Empirical studies show that civic engagement and media scrutiny enhance accountability and raise public trust.
	• Increase transparency of investigations and trial processes via public dashboards	
Policy improvement & legal harmonization	• Integrate digital tools with legal oversight (e-procurement + audit trails)	Suardi et al. (2025) find e-procurement effective only when coupled with regulatory checks; aligning with UNCAC will reinforce consistency.
	• Align KPK Law with international anti-corruption norms (UNCAC)	

3.1 Institutional Reform & Leadership Integrity

Reform initiatives should prioritize restoring KPK's independence, particularly by revising the 2019 amendments that limited its wiretapping authority and subjected it to political oversight boards. (Calvin, 2024) emphasizes that these restrictions erode the commission's deterrent capacity and diminish public confidence. Additionally, transparent and merit-based recruitment can reduce patronage and ensure integrity across leadership positions—both within KPK and other enforcement bodies.

3.2 Strengthening Rule of Law & Judicial Independence

To close procedural loopholes, it's crucial to implement clear appellate procedures and standardize sentencing guidelines for corruption convictions. Fadillah (2024) and Umacina & Amsori (2024) have documented how inconsistent jurisprudence and prolonged appeals allow perpetrators to evade accountability. Empowered Corruption Courts with defined case timelines and mandatory minimum sentences can deter legal manipulation and improve judicial consistency.

3.3 Public Participation & Media Oversight

Expanding whistle-blower safeguards and enabling easier reporting mechanisms—including anonymous digital platforms—can encourage public involvement in uncovering corruption. Opening up investigation and trial data to the public (e.g., online dashboards showing case progress) increases transparency, enabling more meaningful media scrutiny. Numerous studies show that media coverage and active civil society play a pivotal role in exposing corruption and maintaining enforcement integrity.

3.4 Policy Improvement & Legal Harmonization

Digital tools—particularly e-procurement systems—must be buttressed with robust legal oversight, including mandatory digital audit trails, vendor blacklist systems, and real-time procurement monitoring. Suardi et al. (2025) highlight that without these controls, technology may merely conceal corrupt practices rather than deter them. Additionally, harmonizing domestic legislation with international frameworks, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), can introduce global best practices and strengthen legal consistency.

D. CONCLUSION

This study concludes that law enforcement against corruption in Indonesia remains significantly below public expectations, primarily due to enduring structural limitations and political interference. While the country has developed a robust legal framework—comprising Law No. 31 of 1999, Law No. 20 of 2001, the Corruption Court Law, and the institutional role of the KPK these instruments have not translated into consistent and effective enforcement. Recent reforms, particularly the 2019 revision of the KPK Law, have instead contributed to the erosion of institutional independence, weakening the very mechanisms designed to combat corruption.

Empirical evidence, as reflected in high-profile corruption cases such as the *Pertamina fuel fraud*, *Wilmar palm oil licensing scandal*, and the *Chromebook procurement irregularities*, illustrates a recurring pattern of selective prosecution, fragmented institutional coordination, and legal impunity for politically connected actors. The overlap of mandates between the KPK, National Police, and Attorney General's Office often results in jurisdictional disputes and enforcement inefficiencies. At the same time, limited resources, politicized leadership, and public skepticism further constrain the ability of anti-corruption bodies to operate transparently and impartially.

To address these systemic shortcomings, the study offers several strategic recommendations. First, it is imperative to restore and reinforce the autonomy of anti-corruption institutions, particularly the KPK, through legislative revision and the re-establishment of independent investigative authority. Second, enhancing judicial transparency and standardizing legal procedures—especially regarding appeals and sentencing can reduce opportunities for manipulation and restore public trust in the justice system. Third, civic participation and media oversight must be encouraged and protected

through stronger whistleblower protections and public access to legal processes. Finally, political neutrality in enforcement must be guaranteed by insulating anti-corruption bodies from executive or partisan control, ensuring that all actors are held equally accountable under the law.

Only through integrated legal reform, institutional realignment, and public empowerment can Indonesia move beyond symbolic anti-corruption efforts and toward genuine legal integrity and governance accountability.

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