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Strengthening Executive Accountability Through Parliamentary Oversight in Indonesia's Constitutional System

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Abstract

This article examines how parliamentary oversight can strengthen executive accountability in Indonesia's presidential constitutional system. The issue is important because the Constitution grants the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) supervisory powers, yet their effectiveness depends on legal design, institutional capacity, and party-political relations. This study uses normative legal research, applying statutory, conceptual, and case approaches to the 1945 Constitution, legislation governing the DPR, relevant parliamentary rules, and Constitutional Court jurisprudence, supported by recent scholarly literature. The analysis shows that interpellation, inquiry, and the expression of opinion perform distinct but complementary functions: they provide channels for explanation, investigation, and institutional assessment, but do not convert the presidential system into a parliamentary one. Their accountability value is weakened when coalition discipline, majoritarian decision-making, limited analytical support, or inadequate follow-up reduce substantive scrutiny. The article argues that accountability can be strengthened through legally disciplined procedures, evidence-based committee work, transparent publication of findings, reasoned executive responses, and systematic monitoring of recommendations. This approach strengthens checks and balances while respecting the constitutional autonomy of the executive.

Keywords: *Checks and balances; Executive accountability; House of Representatives; Parliamentary oversight.*

A. INTRODUCTION

Strengthening executive accountability through parliamentary oversight is a persistent constitutional concern in Indonesia. In a presidential system, the President derives a direct electoral mandate and exercises executive authority independently of parliamentary confidence, while the DPR retains legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions. This arrangement requires oversight that is strong enough to expose unlawful or ineffective government action but sufficiently

bounded to preserve the separation of powers. The experience of Indonesia's multiparty presidentialism demonstrates that formal institutional design does not, by itself, ensure effective legislative scrutiny (Pepinsky, 2025; Perdana et al., 2024).

The constitutional basis for this arrangement is principally found in Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution, which recognizes the DPR's legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions and provides for the rights of interpellation, inquiry, and expression of opinion. These rights are further specified in Article 79 of Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD, as amended. They are intended to enable the DPR to request explanations, investigate the implementation of laws or government policies, and formulate institutional positions on matters of public importance. The functional relationship between the DPR and the President therefore combines cooperation with supervision, rather than a relationship of parliamentary confidence and dependence (Kusuma et al., 2024).

The effectiveness of these mechanisms is also shaped by party competition and coalition arrangements. Indonesia's multiparty presidential system gives presidents incentives to build broad legislative coalitions to secure policy support. Such arrangements may facilitate governability, but they can also reduce the incentives of governing parties to scrutinize executive performance. Studies of Indonesian coalition politics describe how parties that initially occupy opposition positions may subsequently enter government coalitions, potentially narrowing the space for sustained legislative opposition (Al Hamid, 2025; Efendi & Perdana, 2023). More recent analysis further suggests that coalition effects depend not only

on their size but also on how executive and party leaders manage coalition discipline and opposition participation (Prayitno et al., 2026).

Institutional constraints compound these political dynamics. Effective scrutiny requires legislators to obtain reliable and timely government information, evaluate complex policy and budget documents, and distinguish legal non-compliance from policy disagreement. Technical staff, committee research capacity, expert advice, and transparent access to public data are therefore necessary complements to formal parliamentary authority. Without these supports, hearings and requests for explanation may become procedural events that produce limited follow-up rather than sustained examination of executive conduct.

The issue is not simply whether the DPR possesses oversight powers, but whether those powers generate reasoned explanations, verifiable findings, and institutional consequences consistent with the Constitution. Parliamentary oversight should not be equated with unrestricted control over executive discretion. The DPR may scrutinize whether a policy is lawful, properly implemented, transparently financed, and supported by adequate reasons; it should not replace the executive in making day-to-day administrative decisions. This distinction is central to preserving both accountability and the autonomy of the presidential office.

Previous studies have examined parts of this relationship. Kusuma et al. (2024) explain the functional relationship between the DPR and the President through the constitutional distribution of authority and the combination of cooperation and supervision. Sihotang et al. (2024) focus on the limits of DPR recommendations and warn that an expansive interpretation of parliamentary follow-up powers may interfere with presidential prerogatives. Soeparno (2022),

through the study of crisis-budget policy, shows that executive-legislative interaction is shaped by institutional procedures and political incentives, including incentives to cooperate during periods of crisis. These contributions clarify important dimensions of oversight, but they do not fully integrate the constitutional scope of the three DPR rights with the institutional and coalition conditions that determine whether scrutiny produces accountable executive responses.

Recent research adds a further political dimension. Pepinsky (2025) connects Indonesia's electoral and party institutions with oversized governing coalitions and the constraints they may place on executive restraint. Al Hamid (2025) traces the movement of parties from opposition to coalition, while Prayitno et al. (2026) distinguish coordination-oriented coalition governance from arrangements that marginalize opposition and weaken legislative oversight. Hariri et al. (2026), in turn, identify procedural barriers affecting the exercise of the DPR's inquiry right under conditions of a dominant parliamentary coalition. Taken together, these studies show that the formal existence of oversight instruments must be assessed alongside the rules governing their initiation and the incentives of political actors.

The research gap addressed in this article is therefore doctrinal and institutional. Existing studies tend either to explain the constitutional relationship between the DPR and the President, assess the political effects of coalition formation, or examine particular oversight practices. This article brings these strands together by evaluating the legal authority, procedural limits, and institutional conditions of parliamentary oversight as a mechanism of executive accountability. Its novelty lies in clarifying how the three constitutional rights, routine committee supervision, and follow-up arrangements can operate as a

coherent accountability framework without importing parliamentary-system consequences into Indonesia's presidential system. The research question is: how can parliamentary oversight mechanisms of the House of Representatives strengthen executive accountability within Indonesia's constitutional system? The objective is to analyze the legal design and implementation conditions of those mechanisms and to formulate a constitutionally balanced model for strengthening their effectiveness.

B. RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs normative legal research to examine the strengthening of executive accountability through parliamentary oversight in Indonesia. The primary legal materials consist of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly Articles 20A, 7A, and 7B; Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD as amended by Law Number 42 of 2014, Law Number 2 of 2018, and Law Number 13 of 2019; Regulation of the DPR Number 1 of 2020 concerning Rules of Procedure as amended by Regulation of the DPR Number 1 of 2025; and Constitutional Court Decision Number 36/PUU-XV/2017 concerning the scope of the DPR's inquiry right. Secondary legal materials comprise peer-reviewed journal articles and scholarly analyses of constitutional law, presidentialism, coalition politics, parliamentary oversight, and accountability published primarily within the last five years. The study applies statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The statutory approach is used to interpret the constitutional and legislative provisions governing the DPR's supervisory authority; the conceptual approach clarifies executive accountability,

separation of powers, and checks and balances; and the case approach examines the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the inquiry right. Legal materials were collected through document and literature studies, then analyzed qualitatively through systematic legal interpretation and descriptive-analytical evaluation. The analysis is doctrinal and document-based: it does not claim to report interviews, field observations, or original empirical measurements. Scholarly findings on political practice are used as contextual evidence to assess the institutional conditions under which the legal mechanisms operate.

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

a. Concept and Constitutional Foundations of Parliamentary Oversight in Indonesia's Constitutional System

Parliamentary oversight is a constitutional mechanism through which a representative institution monitors executive conduct, evaluates the implementation of public policy, and requires explanations concerning the exercise of public authority. In Indonesia, this function belongs to the DPR as part of the constitutional arrangement established by the post-amendment 1945 Constitution. Oversight is not merely a procedural formality; it is intended to prevent arbitrary exercises of power, promote compliance with law, and ensure that the use of public resources remains subject to democratic scrutiny. The quality of oversight should therefore be assessed by whether it produces reliable information, reasoned evaluation, and appropriate institutional follow-up, rather than by the number of hearings or political statements alone.

Article 20A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution expressly provides that the DPR has legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions. Paragraph (2) recognizes the rights of interpellation, inquiry, and expression of opinion. These provisions establish the constitutional foundation of parliamentary oversight, while Article 79 of the MD3 Law defines the principal instruments more specifically. Interpellation is the right to request information from the Government concerning important and strategic policies with broad effects on society. The inquiry right authorizes an investigation into the implementation of a law or government policy concerning an important, strategic, and broadly consequential matter suspected of contravening laws and regulations. The right to express an opinion enables the DPR to state its position on government policy, extraordinary events, the follow-up of interpellation or inquiry, and specified allegations concerning the President or Vice President.

The three rights are related but are not interchangeable. Interpellation primarily seeks an official explanation; it provides an opportunity for legislators to test the Government's reasons, evidence, and assessment of consequences. The inquiry right is investigatory and is appropriate where the subject matter meets the statutory criteria and requires a more systematic examination. The right to express an opinion gives the DPR an institutional channel to state an assessment after considering relevant information or findings. This distinction matters because the instruments have different legal purposes and procedural requirements. Their use should be justified by the nature of the issue, not simply by the political intensity surrounding a government policy.

The constitutional framework must also be read together with Articles 7A and 7B of the 1945 Constitution. These provisions regulate the special process for proposing the dismissal of the President or Vice President on specified constitutional grounds, including treason, corruption, bribery, other serious criminal offences, disgraceful conduct, or failure to meet the constitutional requirements of office. A DPR statement of opinion concerning such allegations is only one part of that process; it does not itself remove the President from office. The Constitutional Court must first examine and decide the DPR's allegation before the matter proceeds to the People's Consultative Assembly in accordance with the Constitution. Consequently, ordinary oversight of government policy must be distinguished from the exceptional constitutional procedure for presidential dismissal. This distinction prevents parliamentary oversight from being mischaracterized as a general vote of no confidence.

From the perspective of separation of powers, Indonesia's presidential system does not establish a parliamentary relationship in which the Government remains in office only while it retains the confidence of the DPR. The President is elected directly and holds an independent constitutional mandate. At the same time, separation of powers does not mean that the executive is beyond scrutiny. The DPR's oversight role is one of the checks built into the constitutional structure, while cooperation between the branches remains necessary in legislation and budgeting. The functional relationship described by Kusuma et al. (2024) is therefore best understood as a

combination of constitutionally defined cooperation and supervision, not as legislative subordination of the executive.

The statutory framework translates these constitutional principles into procedures. The MD3 Law regulates the DPR's functions and rights, while the DPR's Rules of Procedure provide internal arrangements for conducting meetings, hearings, and oversight activities. The current procedural framework should be read with Regulation of the DPR Number 1 of 2020 and its 2025 amendment. In applying these rules, the DPR must respect both the legal threshold for exercising an oversight right and the substantive scope of the authority being examined. Procedural compliance is not a technical matter alone: it helps ensure that the executive is not subject to arbitrary investigation and that the public can distinguish legitimate scrutiny from partisan contestation.

The Constitutional Court's Decision Number 36/PUU-XV/2017 is relevant to the interpretation of the inquiry right under Article 79 paragraph (3) of the MD3 Law. The decision discusses the relationship between the DPR's inquiry authority and the executive sphere, providing a judicial reference for understanding the legal object of an inquiry. The case demonstrates that the inquiry right is not an unlimited power to investigate every public institution or every matter of political controversy. Its scope must be interpreted by reference to the statutory definition, the relationship of the matter to the Government or executive functions, and the constitutional principles that limit the exercise of public power.

The normative objective of oversight is to make public authority answerable through lawful and transparent procedures. Accountability in this context has at least three connected dimensions. Legal accountability concerns whether executive action complies with the Constitution and statutes. Administrative and performance accountability concern whether a policy is implemented transparently, efficiently, and consistently with its stated objectives. Political accountability concerns whether public officials provide explanations to representative institutions and, ultimately, to citizens through democratic processes. These dimensions may overlap, but they should not be collapsed into a single test. A policy may be politically unpopular without being unlawful, while a formally lawful policy may still require critical scrutiny regarding its implementation, costs, or distributional effects.

A useful accountability framework must also distinguish the forum in which an executive decision is questioned from the legal consequence that may follow. Parliamentary scrutiny can identify policy inconsistency, administrative delay, inefficient expenditure, or a possible violation of law, but these findings do not all trigger the same response. A policy deficiency may call for revision or better implementation; an irregularity in public expenditure may require audit or administrative action; and an allegation of a constitutional violation may need to be referred to the competent legal institution. This graduated approach protects the DPR from treating every disagreement as misconduct and protects the executive from being insulated from meaningful review. It also helps the public understand why a particular oversight process is initiated and what outcome it is legally capable of producing.

Accordingly, the constitutional foundations of parliamentary oversight are sufficiently established, but their practical value depends on principled interpretation and institutional conduct. The DPR must exercise its powers in a manner that is evidence-based, proportionate, and consistent with the presidential system. Oversight strengthens executive accountability when it identifies legal or administrative deficiencies, requires meaningful explanations, and supports corrective action; it weakens constitutional balance when it is used to replace executive discretion or to pursue political pressure without a substantiated legal basis.

b. Implementation of Parliamentary Oversight Mechanisms over the Executive: Instruments, Practices, and Political Dynamics

The implementation of parliamentary oversight in Indonesia operates through both formal constitutional rights and routine institutional activities. The principal formal instruments are interpellation, inquiry, and the right to express an opinion. Alongside these mechanisms, DPR commissions and other parliamentary bodies conduct working meetings, hearings with ministers and government agencies, public hearings, budget discussions, and supervisory visits. These routine activities allow the DPR to monitor policy implementation and the use of state finances before an issue escalates into a formal interpellation or inquiry. Jaidun's focus on budget implementation and Soeparno's analysis of executive-legislative interaction in crisis budgeting illustrate why the budgetary function is closely connected to substantive oversight (Soeparno, 2022).

Interpellation provides a formal channel for requesting an explanation regarding a government policy that is important, strategic, and broadly consequential. Its accountability value lies in requiring the Government to articulate the legal basis, objectives, available evidence, expected effects, and implementation arrangements of the policy. To avoid becoming a purely rhetorical exchange, the DPR should frame questions precisely, make relevant supporting documents available, and evaluate the Government's response against verifiable standards. A useful interpellation process should produce a public record of the questions raised, the explanations provided, and any matters that require subsequent monitoring.

The inquiry right has a more investigatory character. It may be used where the statutory conditions are satisfied and there is a basis to examine the implementation of a law or government policy suspected of contravening legal provisions. An inquiry should therefore be supported by a defined subject, relevant documents, a clear time frame, and procedural safeguards for persons or institutions asked to provide information. The committee's findings should distinguish established facts, unresolved allegations, and policy disagreements. Such discipline increases the credibility of the process and reduces the risk that the inquiry will be perceived as an instrument of partisan conflict rather than constitutional supervision.

The right to express an opinion allows the DPR to formulate an institutional position on government policy, extraordinary events, or the follow-up to interpellation and inquiry. Where the opinion concerns allegations against the President or Vice President within Article 7A of the Constitution,

the special procedure under Article 7B must be respected. In other matters, the expression of opinion can serve to consolidate parliamentary findings and recommendations, but its political significance does not remove the need for a legal basis and adequate evidentiary support. The DPR should clearly identify whether its position is a policy assessment, a recommendation for administrative correction, or a constitutional allegation requiring a distinct legal procedure.

Routine hearings are equally important because many accountability failures become visible through repeated monitoring rather than a single high-profile investigation. Committee meetings can compare policy targets with actual implementation, scrutinize expenditure, seek explanations for delays, and monitor government responses to earlier recommendations. Budget oversight is particularly significant because it connects policy promises with the allocation and use of public resources. Soeparno (2022) shows that executive-legislative relations in crisis budgeting may involve cooperation as well as conflict, and that institutional procedures and political incentives shape how budget decisions are negotiated. This insight supports a view of oversight that is continuous and evidence-based rather than limited to adversarial parliamentary events.

Budget oversight illustrates the practical connection between the DPR's constitutional functions. When the DPR examines the draft and implementation of the state budget, it can compare approved allocations with actual expenditure and evaluate whether public funds serve the stated policy objectives. This scrutiny is not limited to the legality of budget items; it may

also consider transparency, procurement risks, delays, and the distribution of benefits across communities. Nevertheless, the DPR should avoid taking over the executive's operational management of programs. Its proper role is to question the basis and results of spending, require explanations from responsible officials, and recommend corrective legislative or budgetary action where supported by evidence. The budget process can thus operate as a continuous accountability channel between annual parliamentary sessions.

The effectiveness of these mechanisms is nevertheless conditioned by party-political dynamics. In a fragmented party system, presidents often seek broad coalitions to secure support for legislation and budgets. Coalition formation can reduce legislative deadlock, but may also encourage governing parties to moderate criticism of executive conduct. Al Hamid (2025) describes the movement of parties from opposition to coalition in Indonesian presidential politics, while Efendi and Perdana (2023) analyze the use of executive tools to secure legislative support. Perdana et al. (2024) likewise show how coalition-building and presidential resources influence executive-legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems. These studies suggest that coalition stability and accountability are not automatically aligned: the same arrangements that facilitate governance may narrow the incentives for independent scrutiny.

The relationship between coalition size and oversight is not mechanically determined. A large governing coalition may reduce the parliamentary space for opposition, but the intensity of oversight also depends on internal party competition, committee rules, media scrutiny, civil society engagement, and the willingness of legislators to defend institutional

responsibilities. Prayitno et al. (2026) distinguish between coalition arrangements that facilitate coordination and those that consolidate dominance by marginalizing opposition. This distinction is useful for constitutional analysis because it directs attention away from coalition size alone and toward the procedures and incentives that shape legislative independence. The central concern is whether all parliamentary factions retain meaningful opportunities to obtain information, question executive officials, and place substantiated concerns on the parliamentary agenda.

Institutional capacity is another condition of effective implementation. Legislators cannot reasonably evaluate technical policies, complex budget allocations, or administrative programs without access to qualified research support and accurate information. The DPR should therefore strengthen its expert and research services, preserve institutional memory across parliamentary terms, and establish clear procedures for requesting data from ministries and agencies. Access to information should be timely and sufficiently detailed to permit independent verification, while legitimate limitations related to classified information or personal data should be handled through lawful safeguards. Such arrangements can improve the quality of deliberation without compromising legitimate executive responsibilities.

The implementation of oversight also requires a clear follow-up cycle. Each significant hearing or inquiry should identify the issue examined, the evidence considered, the Government's explanation, the DPR's findings, and the institution responsible for responding to any recommendation. Follow-up should be scheduled and publicly documented so that the same matter is not

repeatedly debated without measurable progress. The objective is not to make every parliamentary recommendation an instruction to the executive, but to ensure that the Government responds with reasons and that unresolved issues remain visible to the public and the legislature. In this way, routine oversight can generate an institutional record capable of informing later budgetary, legislative, or legal action.

The interaction between legal norms and political behavior consequently determines whether oversight is substantive or symbolic. The DPR has a broad set of constitutional and statutory tools, but the quality of their use depends on procedural consistency, access to information, analytical capacity, and political independence. Parliamentary scrutiny is strongest where it is based on verifiable facts and clearly defined legal standards; it is weakest where the use of oversight powers is driven principally by short-term bargaining or electoral advantage. Strengthening implementation therefore requires a balance between effective scrutiny, executive autonomy, and transparent public deliberation.

c. Challenges and Strengthening Models of Executive Accountability through Parliamentary Oversight in Indonesia

The challenges facing parliamentary oversight arise from the interaction of political incentives, institutional capacity, and the design of procedural rules. The existence of oversight authority in the Constitution does not ensure that it will be exercised consistently. Where governing parties dominate the DPR, legislators may have limited incentives to scrutinize policies associated with their own coalition. Coalition discipline and the pursuit of cabinet or other political positions can reduce the willingness to initiate investigations or

sustain criticism. Pepinsky (2025) and Prayitno et al. (2026) show how the institutional structure of multiparty presidentialism and the management of governing coalitions can affect representation, opposition, and executive restraint.

A second challenge concerns procedural thresholds and the risk that majoritarian rules may prevent scrutiny from being initiated or sustained. Hariri et al. (2026) identify the potential for parliamentary majority requirements to obstruct the exercise of the inquiry right under conditions of a dominant governing coalition. Their analysis highlights a structural tension: oversight is entrusted to a representative institution, but the same institution may be organized in a way that makes inquiry dependent on the support of the majority whose political interests are connected to the Government under examination. The issue requires careful consideration of the balance between orderly parliamentary procedure, the rights of minority factions, and the need to prevent unfounded investigations. Any reform should preserve procedural safeguards while ensuring that a substantiated request for inquiry cannot be neutralized solely through partisan control of the agenda.

The protection of minority participation is especially important where the initiation or continuation of a formal inquiry depends on parliamentary support. Parliamentary majorities are legitimate outcomes of elections, but majority rule should not automatically eliminate the ability of minority factions to raise substantiated matters of public concern. A balanced procedure can combine a reasonable threshold for proposing an inquiry, screening for legal relevance and evidentiary sufficiency, and safeguards against repetitive or

abusive motions. The aim is neither to grant an unrestricted investigative power to a small group nor to give the governing majority an unreviewable veto. Instead, the rules should ensure that a credible request receives a reasoned procedural decision and that the reasons for acceptance or rejection are recorded. Such a design would strengthen democratic representation while maintaining orderly parliamentary work.

Institutional limitations also weaken accountability. Differences in expertise among legislators, insufficient analytical resources, and barriers to accessing government information can reduce the DPR's ability to examine the legality, efficiency, and effects of public programs. These limitations are particularly significant in areas involving public finance, digital government, infrastructure, and complex regulatory policy. Strengthening parliamentary capacity does not require transferring executive functions to the legislature. Rather, it requires reliable research services, independent technical advice, standardized document requests, and the ability to follow public expenditure and policy performance across the full implementation cycle.

The regulatory framework must also be interpreted with precision. The MD3 Law provides for DPR recommendations and follow-up mechanisms, including provisions in Article 74 as amended. It would therefore be inaccurate to describe the framework as containing no follow-up mechanism at all. The more precise issue is how parliamentary recommendations should be implemented consistently with the constitutional division of powers. Sihotang et al. (2024) warn that an expansive interpretation of the obligation to implement DPR recommendations, particularly if it is treated as allowing

Parliament to direct executive decisions or require sanctions without due regard to presidential authority, may blur the boundary between oversight and executive administration. Recommendations should consequently be framed as reasoned institutional findings within the DPR's constitutional competence, while the executive remains responsible for choosing lawful administrative measures and explaining its response.

An effective follow-up mechanism should also distinguish the legal status of recommendations from the political responsibility to answer them. Where the MD3 Law requires relevant actors to follow up DPR recommendations and permits further parliamentary rights in specified circumstances, those provisions must be interpreted consistently with the constitutional allocation of executive authority. The DPR may require a response and assess whether it is adequate, but it should not assume the role of a superior administrative authority issuing operational commands to ministries. The executive, in turn, should not treat recommendations as optional political commentary: it should explain whether it accepts them, identify the legal and factual grounds for its position, and disclose the steps taken where corrective measures are warranted. This response-based model gives practical effect to the statutory framework without confusing oversight with day-to-day administration.

A strengthening model should begin with procedural clarity and constitutional discipline. Oversight requests should identify the policy or implementation issue, the relevant statutory basis, the information sought, and the reasons that justify parliamentary attention. Inquiry procedures should

include a defined scope, transparent evidentiary standards, an opportunity for the Government and affected institutions to provide explanations, and publication of reasoned findings. Where a recommendation is issued, it should identify the expected outcome and a reasonable period for response, while preserving the distinction between a parliamentary recommendation and a legally binding decision of a competent authority. This approach strengthens the accountability chain without expanding the DPR's powers beyond constitutional limits.

Institutional strengthening should accompany procedural reform. DPR commissions need stable access to legal, economic, budgetary, scientific, and digital-policy expertise. Research units should be able to prepare neutral analytical briefs, compare proposed policy objectives with implementation data, and assess the Government's response to prior findings. Training should be continuous and cross-party so that the capacity to scrutinize executive action does not depend on the political affiliation of individual members. A strengthened institutional memory would also reduce duplication and make parliamentary monitoring more consistent from one session or parliamentary term to the next.

Political accountability requires a parliamentary culture that treats oversight as an institutional obligation rather than a weapon of coalition competition. Governing-party members should be able to question the executive on the basis of evidence without automatically being treated as disloyal to the coalition, while opposition factions should have fair opportunities to raise issues and obtain relevant information. The public should

be able to follow hearings, access non-confidential documents, and understand the reasons behind parliamentary findings. Open procedures and meaningful civil-society participation can increase the reputational cost of neglecting oversight duties and help distinguish public-interest scrutiny from partisan performance.

Transparency and technology can support this model when they are used to improve the quality of evidence rather than merely to publicize parliamentary activity. Digital publication of budget execution, policy indicators, hearing records, government responses, and recommendation follow-up can enable legislators, journalists, researchers, and citizens to compare commitments with actual outcomes. Data should be presented in a usable and traceable form, with clear dates, responsible agencies, and explanations of limitations. Sensitive information must remain protected in accordance with law, but confidentiality should not become a general reason to withhold material necessary for public accountability.

Finally, oversight should be evaluated by its contribution to lawful and responsive governance, not by the frequency of conflict between the DPR and the executive. A productive process may result in a corrected administrative procedure, a revised budget allocation, improved implementation, a legislative amendment, or a reasoned decision not to adopt a recommendation. The DPR should be able to report these outcomes publicly. In turn, the executive should provide substantive responses that explain acceptance, partial acceptance, or rejection of recommendations and identify the legal or factual grounds for its

position. Such a response-and-review cycle can improve accountability while maintaining the constitutional autonomy of both branches.

The challenges of parliamentary oversight in Indonesia therefore cannot be resolved merely by expanding formal powers. The more sustainable approach is to strengthen the legal interpretation and implementation of existing rights, improve the DPR's analytical resources, protect meaningful participation by all parliamentary factions, and make executive responses transparent and reviewable. This model combines legal reform, institutional development, political commitment, and public access to information. It allows the DPR to act as an effective constitutional check without displacing the President's responsibility to administer the Government.

D. CONCLUSION

Parliamentary oversight can strengthen executive accountability in Indonesia when the DPR uses its constitutional rights of interpellation, inquiry, and expression of opinion as distinct but complementary instruments for obtaining explanations, investigating suspected legal or policy irregularities, and formulating reasoned institutional assessments. Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution and Article 79 of the MD3 Law provide the legal foundation for these mechanisms. Their use must, however, remain consistent with the presidential system: ordinary parliamentary scrutiny does not create a vote-of-no-confidence mechanism, and any proposal concerning the dismissal of the President or Vice President must follow the special procedure in Articles 7A and 7B of the Constitution.

The effectiveness of oversight depends on more than the existence of legal authority. Coalition discipline, majoritarian procedures, limited expertise, inadequate access to information, and weak follow-up can reduce scrutiny to a formal exercise. Strengthening accountability therefore requires clear and proportionate procedures, professional research and technical support for DPR commissions, transparent publication of evidence and findings, fair opportunities for parliamentary minorities to participate, and a documented system for monitoring reasoned executive responses. The DPR should prioritize effective use of existing constitutional mechanisms rather than simply seek broader powers. These measures can reinforce checks and balances while respecting the constitutional autonomy of the executive.

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