Strengthening Executive Accountability Through Parliamentary Oversight in Indonesia’s Constitutional System

Abstract

This article examines how parliamentary oversight can strengthen executive accountability in Indonesia’s presidential constitutional system. The issue is important because the Constitution grants the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) supervisory powers, yet their effectiveness depends on legal design, institutional capacity, and party-political relations. This study uses normative legal research, applying statutory, conceptual, and case approaches to the 1945 Constitution, legislation governing the DPR, relevant parliamentary rules, and Constitutional Court jurisprudence, supported by recent scholarly literature. The analysis shows that interpellation, inquiry, and the expression of opinion perform distinct but complementary functions: they provide channels for explanation, investigation, and institutional assessment, but do not convert the presidential system into a parliamentary one. Their accountability value is weakened when coalition discipline, majoritarian decision-making, limited analytical support, or inadequate follow-up reduce substantive scrutiny. The article argues that accountability can be strengthened through legally disciplined procedures, evidence-based committee work, transparent publication of findings, reasoned executive responses, and systematic monitoring of recommendations. This approach strengthens checks and balances while respecting the constitutional autonomy of the executive.